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1 Introduction
In general, human rights obligations are restricted to states’ actions within their
own territory in relation to their own citizens and residents.  However, article1
55(c) of the Charter of the United Nations refers to the promotion of ‘universal
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion’, while article 56
affirms that ‘[a]ll Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action,
in cooperation with the Organisation, for the achievement of the purposes set
forth in article 55’. Thus, states must promote human rights both individually
and jointly.  Furthermore, the Vienna Declaration affirms that the promotion2
and protection of human rights is a legitimate concern of the international
community.  Therefore, the implementation of human rights is clearly not a3
purely domestic matter. This is also evident from the horizontal operation of
human rights between states as it is actually states which are the principal
addressees of international human rights law. Inter-state complaint procedures4
are used to ‘act in the common interest of protecting human rights’.5
Furthermore, jurisprudence,  international treaties, soft law, and customary6
Skogly Beyond national borders: States’ human rights obligations in international cooperation1
(2006) at 6. 
Skogly n 1 above at 76 is of the opinion that the term ‘jointly’ has an extraterritorial dimension. 2
Article 55 of the Charter implies that the promotion of human rights is a means of achieving
international peace and security, since it states in 55(c) that its aims shall be promoted with a
‘view to the creation of conditions of stability and well being which are necessary for peaceful
and friendly relations among nations’. 
UNHCR The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action UN Doc A/CONF 157/23 par 43
(1993). 
This mechanism is not often used. Smith Textbook on international human rights (2007) at 140.4
Ulfstein ‘Human rights, state complaints’ in Wolfrum (ed) The Max Planck encyclopedia of public5
international law (2008) available at http://www.mpepil.com/ (accessed 30 November 2011).  
It is not my intention to revisit the discourse in this regard. The jurisprudence of the European6
Court of Human Rights created confusion since the court in the Bankovic case adopted a
restrictive approach to the interpretation of the jurisdictional clause in art 1 of the European
Convention on Human Rights. See Bankovic v Belgium et al application 52207/99 admissibility
decision (12 November 2001). This case has been widely criticised. See Gondek ‘Extraterritorial
application of the European Convention on Human Rights: Territorial focus in the age of
globalisation?’ (2005) 52 NILR at 349 387. After Bankovic the court seems to have followed a
more articulated interpretation of art 1. See, for instance, Öcalan v Turkey (Merits) application
46221/99 chamber judgment (12 March 2003) and Issa v Turkey application 31821/96 ECtHR
judgment (16 November 2004). The International Court of Justice jurisprudence affirms that
states have certain extraterritorial human rights obligations based on ‘effective control’. Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion, 2004 ICJ Rep 136. The court confirmed that the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights applies to the territories under its occupation, and that Israel is under
an obligation ‘not to raise any obstacle to the exercise of such rights in the fields where
international law provide examples of a progressive development of the
extension of the scope of human rights obligations beyond state borders.  In7
particular,  the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural8
Rights (ICESCR),  has interesting provisions which reveal that the ‘existence9
of extraterritorial obligations in relationship to international cooperation and
assistance based on specific provisions of the Covenant [is] clear’.  10
This phenomenon has given rise to the international law discourse on
‘transnational human rights obligations’,  which entails that states may have11
certain obligations to individuals in other states. These obligations relate not
only to the horizontal relationship between states, but find vertical application
between the state and individuals from another state or states. The
transnational human rights obligations to protect  and to fulfil, are still viewed12
competence has been transferred to Palestinian authorities’. See par 112. 
For a comprehensive discussion, see Skogly n 1 above at ch 4 7. 7
For an overview of the extraterritorial application of the International Covenant on Civil and8
Political Rights (ICCPR), see McGoldrick ‘Extraterritorial application of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ in Coomans and Kamminga (eds) Extraterritorial
application of human right treaties (2004) at 41 81.
Article 2(1) contains the undertaking by each party ‘to take steps, individually and through9
international assistance and co operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum
of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realisation of the rights
recognised in the present Covenant’. In relation to the right to an adequate standard of living,
art 11(1) states that ‘parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realisation of this right,
recognising to this effect the essential importance of international co operation’. Article 11(2),
which articulates the right of everyone to be free from hunger, reads that parties ‘shall take,
individually and through international co operation, the measures, including specific
programmes, which are needed’. Article 15(4) also underscores the importance of international
cooperation as it reads that ‘the States Parties to the present Covenant recognise the benefits to
be derived from the encouragement and development of international contacts and co operation
in the scientific and cultural fields’. 
Skogly n 1above at 98. She is of the opinion that the obligations relate to the substantive content10
of the rights in the Covenant as well as the obligations in Part IV. For a discussion of the comments
by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, see also Künnemann ‘Extraterritorial
application of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ in Coomans
et al (eds)  Extraterritorial application of human righst treaties (2004) at 208 211. Article 4 of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child is also relevant as it reads that ‘With regard to economic,
social and cultural rights, States Parties shall undertake such measures to the maximum extent of
their available resources and, where needed, within the framework of international co operation’
and art 24(4) reiterates the need for international cooperation pursuant to the realisation of the rights
in the Convention. Article 22 of the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights also stresses the
need for international cooperation concerning the realisation of the right to social security. 
Several other terms have been used, such as ‘international’, ‘transborder’, ‘transboundary’ or11
‘extraterritorial’. See Gibney, Tomasevski and Vedsted Hansen ‘Transnational state
responsibility for violations of human rights’ (1999) 12 HHRJ at 267. 
Skogly n 1above at 69. This implies an obligation on states to regulate the activities of third12
parties subject to their jurisdiction or control. This issue applies to the activities of corporations
that operate internationally. 
as part of de lege ferenda, whereas the obligation to respect  constitutes de13
lege lata.  14
However, scholars have indicated a need for the development of the
obligations to fulfil and protect in an era of globalisation and interdepen-
dence.  The obligations to fulfil remain the most controversial issue as these15
obligations imply that states have an international obligation to undertake
positive measures in order to fulfil economic, social, and cultural rights  in16
other states, inter alia, through offering them financial support. The emergence
of such a vertical relationship may face obstacles from the international legal
order. It is important to bear in mind that, in general, international law it is the
primary objective of territorial jurisdiction to avoid conflicts of extraterritorial
jurisdiction in the promotion of sovereign equality  and non-intervention.17 18
Accordingly, the development of human rights obligations which states are
required to fulfil, may conflict with the sovereign equality of states. Therefore,
the discourse on the fulfilment of transnational human rights obligations
invokes the need for the reconciliation of sovereignty with the implementation
of transnational human rights obligations in the current era of globalisation.19
Ultimately, the challenge is to ‘make the ICESCR fit the era of globalisation:
to reach beyond traditional concepts of state sovereignty in order to provide
See for a discussion Skogly n 1 above at 66. This refers to the basic obligation not to interfere13
or to deprive individuals of their enjoyment of human rights. In the context of the current
discussion this implies that states should not impair the enjoyment of human rights in other
states. These obligations are primarily negative. 
See  Coomans ‘Some remarks on the extraterritorial application of the International Covenant14
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ in Coomans et al (eds) Extraterritorial application
of human rights treaties n 10 above at 183 199. 
Coomans ‘Application of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights15
in the framework of international organisations’ (2007) 11 Max Planck UNYB at 390. The
obligation to respect entails the (negative) duty not to interfere with the enjoyment of human
rights. The obligation to protect refers to protection against third parties over which the state has
jurisdiction. 
Hereafter ESCRs. 16
Article 2(1) of the UN Charter. See Beckmann and Fassbender ‘Article 2(1)’ in Simma et al17
(eds) The Charter of the United Nations: A commentary (2002) (2ed) at 68.
Article 2(7) of the UN Charter. See Nolte ‘Article 2(7)’ in Simma et al n 17 above at 148. 18
Globalisation entails certain consequences for international law. It is not my intention to19
present a comprehensive overview of this complex theme. For an extensive discussion, see
Bederman Globalization and international law (2008). It must be borne in mind that various
developments have occurred in international law during the current era of globalisation. See
Mégret ‘Globalisation and international law’  in Wolfrum (ed) The Max Planck encyclopedia
of public international law (2008) available at http://www.mpepil.com/ (accessed 25 September
2011). In this regard I shall refer to the changing subjects and the objects of international law,
the departure from dealing traditionally with inter state issues to distinctive global issues, the
increasing importance of cooperation amongst actors and the importance of the human rights
regime, which has the potential to alter the aspirations of international law in a cosmopolitan
direction.
for international solidarity and achieve global justice’.20
It is, therefore, the principal aim of this article to respond to this challenge and
provide a conceptual understanding of sovereignty for the further development
of transnational economic, social, and cultural human rights obligations which
must be met. The reconciliation of the emergence of the common concern of
mankind/humankind  on the basis of the common interest in international21
environmental law and sovereignty, has provided a similar challenge. I have
previously addressed this challenge, and indicated that common concern may
mould sovereignty in response to the needs of the international community. It
is for this reason that I examine the implications of this notion for transnational
human rights obligations via reference to the discourse in international
environmental law. In this process, I discuss the content and scope of the
common interest and the common concern. Accordingly, I focus on the legal
implications of these notions and determine to what extent this impacts on
sovereignty, reciprocal obligations between states, and the legal recognition
of subjects of international law. I also consider the role of the moral principle
of ‘solidarity’ pursuant to a more equitable distribution of the burden-sharing
of common obligations. Furthermore, I ascertain how these progressive
developments may be relevant to the discourse on transnational human rights
obligations. I conclude the article with closing remarks and indicate that the
emergence of the common concern may respond to the stated challenge
concerning the transnational human rights obligations to fulfil ESCRs. This is
indicative of a progressive development towards a departure from an overly
state-centred international law, to a structure that affirms the participation of
other actors within the international community in the well-being of current
and future generations.
2 Common interest and the common concern of mankind
2.1 Introduction
The Preamble to the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Coomans n 14 above at 184. The main focus of this article will be on ESCRs as contained in20
this Convention. This does not detract from the fact that other universal human rights treaties
are linked with the enjoyment of ESCRs. The most prominent example is the right to life in art
6 of the ICCPR. 
I shall refer to mankind in order to be consistent. The notion can be found in several21
international documents, such as the UN General Assembly resolution 43/53 of 1988, the UN
General Assembly resolution 44/207 of 1989, Noordwijk Declaration of the Conference on
Atmospheric Pollution and Climate Change, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change of 1992 (UNFCCC), and the Convention on Biological Diversity of 1992 (CBD). See
also Biermann ‘Common concern of mankind: The emergence of a new concept of international
environmental law’ (1996) 34 AVR at 426 and 431. See also Timoshenko ‘Responses to
environmental challenges: UNEP experience’ in Al Nauimi et al (eds) International legal issues
arising under the United Nations as decade of international law (1995) 154 170. 
Change, acknowledges ‘that change in the Earth’s climate and its adverse
effects are a common concern of humankind’, whereas the Convention on
Biological Diversity of the same year, affirms that ‘the conservation of
biological diversity is a common concern of humankind’. According to
Brunnée, the common concern of mankind is a facet of ‘common interest’. In
this regard, the common interest refers to the survival of humankind. In some
instances ‘common interest’ may result in an international law rule that entails
certain duties. ‘Common interest’ serves as a driving force in the development
of rules.  It is, therefore, the common interest that gives rise to common22
concern. The common interest of all states makes cooperation crucial, and,
accordingly, highlights the interdependence of states.  Common interest is the23
product of coinciding individual state interests, which means that it reflects
egocentric, rather than altruistic, features. This implies that individual state
interests must coincide before the common interest will arise. This may,
however, prove to be difficult in the international arena, which is characterised
by heterogeneous states with differential interests.
It is important for the current discussion to recognise two important issues.
Earlier treaties do not refer explicitly to the common concern but they do
follow the common concern regimes.  Furthermore, the ‘concern’ element24
does not carry with it any proprietary meaning, but relates to both the causes
and the responses to common concerns. The existence of a common concern
is not dependant on the inclusion of this notion in a treaty, but does simplify
the achievement of consensus on whether an issue constitutes a common
concern, and clarify the legal consequences attached to this designation.
Consequently, the fact that human rights treaties do not include a reference to
this notion, does not mean that human rights are precluded. The fact that
common concern does not have proprietary connotations, implies that it is not
impossible to apply this concept to the current discussion on transnational
human rights obligations to fulfil ESCRs. 
This discourse is not purely academic. The plight of environmentally displaced
persons (EDPs)  provides a concrete example of the transnational application25
Brunnée ‘“Common interest”  echoes from an empty shell? Some thoughts on common22
interest and international environmental law’(1989) 37 ZaöRV at 791 808. However, common
interest is the product of the coinciding individual state interests, which implies that it is
characterised by egocentric (anthropocentric) rather than altruistic features.
Scholtz ‘Collective (environmental) security: The yeast for the refinement of international law’23
(2008) 19 Yearbook of International Environmental Law at 150. 
Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage of 1972 and the24
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer of 1987. See Brunnée ‘Common
areas, common heritage and common concern’ in Bodansky et al (eds) The Oxford handbook
of international environmental law (2007) at 550 573 and 565.
See Scholtz ‘Environmentally displaced persons, climate change and the AU: The day after25
no tomorrow?’ (2010)  35 SAYIL at 35 55.
of the human rights’ framework on the basis of a common concern. A home
state may be barred from taking action to fulfil the ESCRs of its emigrant
citizens in other states. Furthermore, EDPs may not successfully claim the
fulfilment of ESCRs from third states for having contributed to climate change
through the emission of greenhouse gasses.  It is in this regard, that the26
common concern may offer a potential solution. The fact that the preamble to
the UNFCCC recognises the consequences of climate change – such as
environmental displacement – as a common concern, may provide a point of
departure for the development of the transnational fulfilment of ESCRs (as
response measures) in relation to EDPs.27
2.2 CCM and its consequences in international environmental
law
2.2.1 Towards the custodial element of sovereignty
The meeting of the Group of Legal Experts to Examine the Concept of the
Common Concern of Mankind in Relation to Global Environmental Issues,
made it clear that common concern does not imply a departure from state
sovereignty in that states retain permanent sovereignty over natural
resources.  It is important to bear in mind that permanent sovereignty is28
viewed as a component of  custodial state sovereignty, which is the economic
face of sovereignty.  Common concern clearly entails implications for29
sovereignty since the notion also applies to certain resources located in the
territory of individual states. Common concern arises irrespective of trans-
boundary harm. In this regard, Boyle has made it clear that common concern
provides the international community with a ‘legitimate interest in resources
of global significance and a common responsibility to assist in their
sustainable development’.  The existence of the common interest, therefore,30
challenges the notion of sovereignty, and may accordingly result in its
adaptation.  It is accordingly important to reflect on this issue. 31
Beyerlin ‘Environmental migration and international law’ in Hestermeyer et al (eds)26
Coexistence, cooperation and solidarity Liber Amicorum Rüdiger Wolfrum volume I (2011) 319
332 at 328. 
It is not my intention to dissect this issue in detail. A forthcoming publication will deal with27
the transnational application of human rights to EDPs in the African context. 
Report of the Meeting of the Group of Legal Experts to Examine the Concept of the Common28
Concern of Mankind in Relation to Global Environmental Issues. See Horn ‘The implications
of the concept of common concern of mankind on a human right to a healthy environment’
(2004) 1 MqJICEL at 237.
Perez Cooperative sovereignty: From independence to interdependence in the structure of29
international environmental law (2000) at 97. 
Birney, Boyle and Redgwell International law and the environment (2009) at 130.  30
See Tierney ‘Questioning authority: The normative challenge in forging an international31
community’ in Tierny et al (eds) Towards an international legal community? The sovereignty
of states and the sovereignty of international law (2006) at 1 16. 
I have previously discussed the influence of common concern on the notion of
permanent sovereignty in the context of global environmental degradation.32
I have coined the notion of ‘custodial sovereignty’ in terms of which a state is
the custodian of its global environmental resources.  Other states have an33
expectation that the relevant state will protect its resources for mankind as a
whole. The other states have a duty to support the custodial state in fulfilling
its obligations. The custodial state may exploit its resources, but is restricted
in doing so by the expectations and interests of other states. Underlying the
notion of custodial sovereignty, are two fundamental elements. The first
element involves the common (global) responsibility of all states for the
protection of global environmental resources. The second element involves the
differentiated responsibilities of a state’s contribution to the protection of these
resources. 
2.2.2 Differential burden sharing for common well-being
Custodial sovereignty requires differential treatment.  It must be borne in34
mind that CCM makes provision for fair and equitable burden-sharing. In
terms of the Hague Recommendations on International Environmental Law,
‘costs should be shared equitably among states, taking into account historic
responsibilities and present technical and financial capabilities’.  This implies35
that the legal obligations that address the common concern are differential.36
It is for this reason that certain legal obligations that relate to the common
concern are guided by the common but differentiated obligations principle.37
Scholtz ‘Custodial sovereignty: Reconciliation of sovereignty and global environmental32
challenges amongst the vestiges of colonialism’ (2008) 55 NILR at 323. 
These resources are renewable natural resources of which a part or the whole of the resource33
is located in the territory of a state, but which is needed and enjoyed by the whole of mankind.
It must be borne in mind that my discussion of custodial sovereignty relates to global
environmental resources and not the global commons. The notion of the common concern of
mankind is applicable to global environmental resources and the common heritage of mankind
relates to the latter. The main difference between the two areas is the fact that states cannot
make territorial claims to these areas. However, several similarities are also evident. The
management of the areas imposes shared responsibilities on states to the benefit of mankind. The
areas must also be preserved for future generations. 
French ‘Developing states and international environmental law: The importance of34
differentiated responsibilities’ (2000) 49 ICLQ at 35 and 46.
Paragraph 3 of ‘The Hague recommendations on international environmental law of 1635
Augustus 1991’ in Bilderbeek (ed) Biodiversity and international law: The effectiveness of
international environmental law (1992) at 194 202. 
For an analysis of differential treatment, see Rajamani Differential treatment in international36
environmental law (2006).
This principle has been the source of contention in international law. For a comprehensive37
overview, see Stone ‘Common but differentiated responsibilities in international law’ (2004) 98
AJIL at 276 and Scholtz ‘One environment, different countries: A discourse on common but
differentiated responsibilities’ (2008) 33 SAYIL at 113 136. Article 3(1) of the UNFCCC refers
to the common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDRRC)
principle. The Kyoto Protocol follows the blueprint of the UNFCCC as the central obligations
The principle which most clearly reflects the essence of differential treatment
in international environmental law, is the principle of common but
differentiated responsibility.  This principle entails two main elements.38
Firstly, it concerns the common responsibility of states for the protection of the
environment. This refers to the shared obligations of states towards the
protection of an environmental resource. Secondly, it concerns the
acknowledgement of different circumstances, such as the contribution of states
to an environmental problem and the ability to address the ensuing threat. The
differential responsibility is translated into differential obligations for states.
The differentiated obligations may relate to the special requirements of
developing countries (for financial resources) and developed countries (the
expectation that developing countries protect global environmental resources),
as well as differential circumstances (the existence of global environmental
resources in developing countries).
Cullet views differential treatment ‘as the instances where the principle of
sovereign equality is sidelined to accommodate extraneous factors, such as
divergences in levels of economic development or unequal capacities to tackle
a given problem’.  Consequently, the common interest invokes a departure39
from the traditional reciprocal international legal obligations between states.
This does not imply a departure from sovereign equality as the fundamental
constitutional principle between states. Differential treatment provisions rather
constitute an exception – on the basis of state consent – to traditional
reciprocity.  However, this exception may be seen as a pointer to the fact that40
sovereign equality, too, may also be subject to change. 
2.2.3 Evaluation of common concern, custodial sovereignty, and
lessons for the current discussion
Custodial sovereignty should not be viewed as heralding the demise of
sovereignty. Sovereign equality plays an important role as it also affords
protection to less powerful states in the sense that it guarantees the juridical
equality of developing states.  States, therefore, retain the primary41
responsibility for their territories. However, custodial sovereignty
acknowledges that the common concern around global environmental
problems, requires an adaptation of sovereignty if it is to respond to the needs
of the Protocol are applicable to Annex I countries. See art 3 of the Protocol.
Cullet ‘Differential treatment in international law: Towards a new paradigm of inter state38
relations’ (1999) 10 EJIL at 549 and 577. 
Id39  at 551. 
Several other exceptions exist, such as art 27(3) of the UN Charter. See Simpson Great powers40
and outlaw states. Unequal sovereigns in the international legal order (2004) at 48.
See the ‘Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co41
operation Among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations’ (hereafter the
Friendly Relations Declaration). UN GAR 2625 (XXV) of 20 October 1970.
of the international community. The increasing interdependence between states
and the need to cooperate in addressing the common concern, necessitates an
adaptation of sovereign equality. It is, therefore, not sufficient for sovereignty
to focus on the independence of states. Sovereignty should take heed of the
transformation of an international law of co-existence, into a law of co-
operation.  Furthermore, scholars have recently recognised signs pointing to42
a shift towards an international community with community interest.43
Custodial sovereignty is appropriate for the constant adaptation of
international law in response to globalisation. It is suitable to accommodate the
factual and legal interdependence of states and the recognition of the
participation of non-state actors in international law. Furthermore, custodial
sovereignty gives expression to the pursuit of material equity through
international cooperation as reflected in articles 55(a)(b) and 56 of the UN
Charter. Therefore, the acceptance of custodial sovereignty does not imply a
radical alteration of international law, but rather accounts for the dynamic
development of international law and as such strengthens international law. 
Custodial sovereignty entails that, in the exercise of their permanent
sovereignty, individual states are restricted by the common interest.  They are44
custodians of the international community, which must act in accordance with
the common concern of mankind. Sovereignty must, therefore, be exercised
for the benefit of mankind – made up by current and future generations. This
means that sovereignty must be exercised in the interest of the survival of
humankind. The notion of the common concern furthermore introduces a
temporal aspect as custodial sovereignty implies a responsibility towards
current and future generations.
What does this mean for the observance of transnational human rights
obligations in the context of the current discussion? It has already been
indicated that it is questionable whether the observance of human rights
currently constitutes a common interest that may give rise to the common
concern. The designation of the causes and response measures of climate
change in the Preamble of the UNFCCC, may create a link for the
transnational application of human rights in relation to EDPs. Furthermore,
paragraph 4 of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action  may45
constitute a point of departure for such a future development. It is on this basis
that the emergence of custodial sovereignty may provide insight into how to
Friedmann The changing structure of international law (1964) at 249.42
Simma ‘From bilateralism to community interest in international law’ (1994) 250 Recueil Des43
Cours at 217. 
I have not considered the emergence of the international community in relation to sovereignty44
in my previous publications. 
This paragraph affirms that human rights are seen as a legitimate concern of the international45
community. 
reconcile transnational human rights and sovereignty. Custodial sovereignty
affirms the notion that modern international sovereignty does not only consist
of international external sovereignty,  but also has an internal dimension.46 47
The overlap between external and internal sovereignty is clear: the internal
element is primarily directed at the inhabitants of a state; whereas the external
element is directed against other participants within the international
community. The implication of the existence of custodial sovereignty in an
emerging international community, means that the external element of
sovereignty remains important as it protects the state and its inhabitants against
outside interference. It acts as a shield against unwarranted foreign
intervention. Sovereignty, therefore, fulfils an important role in guarding
against the imperialist motives of the powerful. However, sovereignty may not
be used as an excuse for non-fulfilment of ESCRs. Custodial sovereignty
provides a useful link between the internal and external dimensions of modern
international sovereignty. It must be borne in mind that international law
implies external sovereignty, and vice versa.  The international law48
limitations on internal sovereignty have also become ‘constitutive limitations
to internal sovereignty’.  Sovereignty, therefore, is also made up of rights and49
obligations, such as the transnational human rights obligations of states under
international law. However, the obligations of states are not to be seen as
constraints on state sovereignty, but rather its integral nuts and bolts.50
Obligations constitute sovereignty in conjunction with rights, and sovereignty
is also the source of rights and duties for states. The dynamic aspect of factual
reality may spark the development of different rights and obligations, and this
will influence the notion of sovereignty. The prominence of human rights in
international law, has given rise to changes in the notion of sovereignty. The
need for its universal promotion through transnational obligations, may
accordingly adapt sovereignty in line with the requirements of the international
community. This implies a sovereignty alligned with dynamic circumstances.
Sovereignty may, accordingly, respond to the common interest, such as the
survival of mankind. This does not lead to the ‘erosion’ or ‘demise’ of
sovereignty, but rather to its strengthening in response to the needs of the
international community. In this way states can act as custodians of the well-
being of human individuals and of sovereignty. Custodial sovereignty
recognises the internal and external rights and obligations of states. Therefore,
the internal obligations of a state relate primarily to the inhabitants of a
This relates to the equal inter state rights and duties. 46
This refers to the international rights and duties of a state regarding its ultimate authority and47
competence over people and things in its territory See Besson ‘Sovereignty’ in Wolfrum (ed)
The Max Planck encyclopedia of public international law (2008) available at http://www.mpepil
.com/ (accessed 30 November 2011).
Ibid.48
Ibid.49
I therefore feel that it is incorrect to refer to the ‘erosion’ of sovereignty. 50
custodial state and is external to the international community. However, it is
also true that the internal responsibility of states is also of concern to the
international community as it relates to the promotion and protection of the
common interest. This implies that the international community of states also
incurs a legitimate interest in relation to the internal responsibilities of states.
Therefore, sovereignty exhibits a relational or interactive nature. The internal
element of sovereignty is, therefore, exercised primarily for the benefit of the
inhabitants of the state, and the state bears the primary responsibility for the
promotion of the welfare of its inhabitants through domestic structures. States
still have exclusive claims over their territories in terms of their territorial
integrity and political independence. The acceptance of custodial sovereignty
does not introduce either an era of non-territorial governance, or the end of
territorial sovereignty. The emergence of a common interest in relation to the
internal obligations of a state may, indeed, see the recognition of a common
concern and the acceptance of obligations in terms of a treaty. The custodial
element of sovereignty may accordingly necessitate differential obligations in
the pursuit of international cooperation. 
The emerging international moral principle of solidarity offers a source for
differential treatment provisions.  Solidarity entails that states must be held51
responsible for the external effects of their policies. Thus, states should
conduct their policies in a way that takes the interests of the international
community into account. Not only should they avoid any action or actions that
may cause substantial injury to other states, but they should also undertake
jointly or separately, positive measures to promote the benefit of the
international community. Furthermore, the principle of solidarity may aim to
ameliorate the inequalities of particular states over others. This implies that in
aiming to realise a common goal, some states may have to contribute more
than others. 
Solidarity finds practical application through differential treatment provisions.
Paragraph 6 of the UN Millennium Declaration (General Assembly resolution A/55/L.2 of 1851
September 2000) affirms that solidarity is one of the ‘fundamental values to be essential to
international relations in the twenty first century’. This paragraph also defines solidarity in terms
of burden sharing. On the topic of solidarity, see Macdonald ‘Solidarity in the practice and
discourse of public international law’ (1996) 8 PILR at 259. Wolfrum ‘Solidarity amongst states:
An emerging structural principle of international law’ in Dupuy et al (eds) Völkerrecht als
Wertordnung Festschrift für Chrstian Tomuschat (1995) at 1087. I do not perceive solidarity as
a legally binding principle. See Dann ‘Solidarity and the law of development’ in Wolfrum and
Kojima (eds) Solidarity: A structural principle of international law (2010) at 55 77. It serves
rather as a moral driver for the development of measures that reflect solidarity. International
environmental law contains various examples of the influence of solidarity. See Riemer
Staatengemeinschaftliche Solidarität in der Völkerrechtsordnung (2003) at 160. For an overview
of solidarity in the context for the call for a New International Economic Order, see Scholtz ‘A
sustainable and equitable legal order’ in  Benidickson et al (eds) Environmental law and
sustainability after Rio (2011) at 119 137. 
This does not mean that it excludes reciprocity. Reciprocity, however, does not
imply equal obligations. Reciprocity may, for instance, rather entail that
developing countries have the duty to use assistance efficiently.
Thus, solidarity may be an important principle in the international community
which cooperates as a consequence of the shared desire to promote
transnational human rights. It does not disregard the importance of the primary
responsibility of states for the protection and promotion of human rights as
regards their citizens and residents. This primary responsibility also entails that
states must first use their resources to fulfil the needs of their own residents in
accordance with their own resources. They will contravene their primary
obligations when they use their resources to fulfil the needs of people in other
states, and then lack the means to take care of their own. Solidarity results in
burden-sharing among the participants in the international community, and
affirms a shared responsibility for the promotion of human rights. 
A shared responsibility in terms of the universal promotion of human rights,
may be abstracted, inter alia, from the Declaration on the Right to
Development.  Furthermore, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in52
the Millennium Declaration also provide examples of burden sharing  based53
on a shared responsibility in relation to developmental goals.54
This reference to the MDGs, does not imply that the Goals and the ESCR
frameworks are identical.  It is, however, interesting to refer to the MDGs as55
one of the Goals is to develop a global partnership for development.  It is,56
therefore, suggested that the responsibility for achieving the Goals should be
internationalised, in the sense that other states should assist developing states
General Assembly resolution 41/128 of 1986. For a discussion see Chowdhury et al The right52
to development in international law (1992). This document is, however, contested by developed
countries and it is questionable whether it creates concrete legal obligations. Bulajic Principles
of international development law: Progressive development of the principles of international
law relating to the new international economic order (1993) at 33.
Burden sharing in the declaration is based on some measure of reciprocity. For instance, the53
declaration exhorts providers of assistance ‘to grant more generous development assistance,
especially to countries that are genuinely making an effort to apply their resources to poverty
reduction’. See par III Item 15.
Paragraph 6 includes shared responsibility as one of the fundamental values, which means that54
‘responsibility for managing worldwide and economic and social development … must be
shared among the nations of the world’. This paragraph also refers to the central role that the UN
should play in this regard as the most universal and representative organisation’. For a
discussion of the legal status of this declaration, see Alston ‘Ships passing in the night: The
current state of the human rights and development debate seen through the lens of the
millennium development goals’ (2005) 27 HRQ at 771. 
The MDGs relate most closely to the ESCRs, but the former are more limited. 55
MDG 8. 56
to meet the Goals, where the latter show that they are unable to do so.57
Although Alston indicates that such an international obligation does not yet
exist, he does not exclude the possibility that further developments  may58
provide a basis for the development of such a customary law obligation.  59
Shared responsibility is important in that it implies that the responsibilities of
richer states are limited through the division of obligations.  It is accordingly60
important to develop the exact responsibilities of states in order to ensure that
the division does not cause confusion and uncertainty as to obligations.61
International organisations, in particular the UN, have an important role to
play in coordinating the residual responsibility of the international community. 
2.2.4 Spawning new subjects: A departure from state-centered law?62
Another interesting aspect of the common concern is that it does not apply to
states, but to mankind. Mankind includes all of the members of the human
species as a whole, and encompasses present and future generations, and as
such invokes intergenerational and intra-generational equity.  It has been63
suggested that the inclusion of this notion in several international instruments
implies that ‘mankind’ is an emerging subject of international law.  It is,64
however, difficult to consider future generations as (partial or full) subjects of
current international law with the capacity to have international rights and/or
duties.  This, however, does not mean that such a development is unthinkable65
in the future, and that the notion does not have the potential to expand the
See Alston n 91above at 775.57
The Millennium Declaration was followed by the Monterrey Consensus of the International58
Conference on Financing Development (Report of the International Conference on Financing
for Development, Monterrey, Mexico 18 22 March 2002 A/CONF 198/11). See also the Paris
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of 2 March 2005.
Alston n 91 above at 777 778. It is not my intention to prove the existence of such an59
obligation, but rather to discuss the conceptual framework for such a development. 
Gibney remarks that: ‘This return to universal principles should not be read to mean that all60
states (particularly Western states) are responsible for all things for all people’. Gibney
International human rights law returning to universal principles (2008) at 3. See, for an
analysis, Shue ‘Mediating duties’ (1988) 98 ETHICS at 687.
‘Development compacts’ may provide an example of a mechanism that may be used to ensure61
clarity concerning the division of obligations. This proposal was made by Arjun Sengupta
(independent expert on the right to development). See Sengupta ‘Development cooperation and
the right to development’ available at www.harvardfxbcenter.org/resources/working
papers/FXBC  WP12Sengupta.pdf (accessed 30 November 2011).
This dichotomy has been criticised by several eminent scholars. See Higgins n 48 above at 39.62
See further Schreuer ‘The waning of the sovereign state: Towards a new paradigm for
international law’ (1993) 4 EJIL at 447.  
Trindade n 52 above at 281.63
Ibid.64
See Malhotra ‘A commentary on the status of future generations as a subject of international65
law’ in Agius et al (eds) Future generations and international law (1998) at 39 49. 
recognition of the international legal personality of international law players.66
The concept and meaning of international legal personality has undergone
various changes: the number of recognised subjects of international law has
been expanded,  and it is not impossible to establish among the living some67
form of representation for mankind.  For example, the position of the68
individual in international law has seen remarkable changes with the advent
of international criminal law, humanitarian law, and human rights law. The
recognition of the status of certain non-state actors, such as non-governmental
organisations, is a topical debate in international law.  It must be borne in69
mind that non-state actors play an important role in various aspects of
international law.  Human rights and international environmental law are the70
two fields in which NGO participation is most common.
The notion of the common concern of mankind may serve as a catalyst for the
further expansion of legal subjects in international law. This is feasible in that
the concern of mankind may give rise to legal obligations and rights applicable
not only to states, but also to non-state actors, and which fulfil an important
role in the pursuit of the common interest of constituents of mankind. This,
however, does not mean that states have become irrelevant: they have an
important role to play in international law,  and they will most probably
remain the primary actors of international law. The expansion of legal
personality does not alter this position, but rather envisages a complementary
role for other actors. 
Furthermore, the recognition of the common concern and the expansion of
legal subjectivity may impact on the role of states. I am of the opinion that the
common concern may initiate a process in terms of which states exercise
functional rather than discretionary powers.  Functional powers entail that71
The ICJ has established the possibility that non state entities may also be subjects of66
international law. See Reparations for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations,
Advisory Opinion 1949 ICJ Rep 173. This decision also provides for full and partial legal
personality for subjects. Only states have full legal personality.
For a comprehensive overview of the topic, see Portmann Legal personality in international67
law (2010). 
See Minors Oposa v Secretary of the Department of Environmental and Natural Resources68
(1993) 33 ILM at 173.
See in general Klabbers ‘(I can’t get no) recognition: Subjects doctrine and the emergence of69
non state actors’ in Petman et al (eds) Nordic cosmopolitanism: Essays in international law for
Martti Koskenniemi (2003) at 351 370.
See, for an overview, Alston et al (eds) Non state actors and human rights (2005). It is of70
particular interest to observe the rise of international NGOs. Martens ‘Examining the (non )
status of NGOs in international Law’ (2003) 10 IJGLS at 1 and 4. See Yamin ‘NGOs and
international environmental law: A critical evaluation of their roles and responsibilities’ (2001)
10 Recueil Des Cours at 149.
See for the distinction between discretionary and functional powers Dupuy ‘Humanity and the71
environment’ (1991) 2 CJIELP at 201 and 203. 
states are restricted in their actions by the rules enacted in the interest of
mankind. This implies that states are the agents of mankind and must facilitate
solutions for the greater good of mankind. 
Ultimately, common concern may imply a progression towards a departure
from an overly inter-state-centred international law, to a structure that
accommodates the proliferation of other participants, which may promote the
well-being of mankind. This view takes account of the artificial construct of
state borders, and reflects the interconnected nature of all human beings in the
shared biosphere.
Common concern accordingly provides a conceptual basis for the role of states
as primary, but not exclusive, agents for the promotion of the well-being of
mankind. It serves as a catalyst for the acknowledgement of the recognition of
other participants in the international community in various positions in
international law, whether as full or partial subjects, or as mere role players.
The discussion above does not imply that the common concern has already
sparked a development which is indicative of the transformation of an inter-
state law towards an international order that serves the well-being of
individuals.  Common interest and the common concern, however, contribute72
to progressive transformation in order to ensure that it gains further ground in
international law. The discussion also does not imply that sovereign equality
– which serves as the constitutional premise of the international legal order –
has been replaced with a new Grundnorm.  States are still responsible for the73
public order in their territories.
3 Conclusion
In this article I have attempted to address the reconciliation of the potential
development of transnational human rights obligations to fulfil ESCRs with
the notion of sovereignty in the context of the current era of globalisation. This
discussion has drawn lessons from a discourse in international environmental
law concerned with the reconciliation of the common concern of mankind and
sovereignty in the context of global environmental degradation. I have
Clapham ‘The role of the individual in international law’ (2010) 21 EJIL at 25 30.72
Tomuschat ‘Obligations for states without or against their will’ (1993) 241 Recueil Des Cours73
at 162. Some scholars may view this as evidence of the manner in which sovereignty is being
‘humanised’ as it should serve the interests of humanity. For a recent analysis of the
humanisation of sovereignty, see Peters, ‘Humanity as the A and Ù of Sovereignty’ (2009) 20
EJIL at 513. I have made use of some of the interesting arguments raised by Peters in the
following paragraphs. According to Peters the humanisation of sovereignty entails that
sovereignty is a second order norm ‘which is derived from and geared towards the protection
of basic human rights, needs, interests, and security’. Trindade refers to the ‘humanisation of
International Law’, which introduces the new jus gentium, the ‘International law for mankind’.
See Trindade n 52 above at 280.
indicated that the emergence of a common concern in relation to ESCRs may
provide a conceptual basis for the reconciliation of sovereignty and the
progressive development of transnational ESCRs. The plight of EDPs may
serve as a concrete example of how the common concern may serve as a
vehicle for the application of transnational ESCRs in response to forced
migration as a consequence of climate change. It is for this reason that I have
explained the consequences of the common concern. 
The common concern of mankind in the international community may spark
the further development of the legal recognition of other participants of the
international community, who fulfil an important role in the promotion and
implementation of ESCRs. In this regard, the common concern imports a
temporal aspect. The international community includes future generations and
the participants of the community need to represent these interests.
Furthermore, common concern has several important consequences for
statehood. It implies that the powers of states may change in time towards
functional powers, which will result in states loosing discretionary power
when dealing with issues of common interest. This means that sovereign
statehood must also adapt to the needs of the international community. 
It is my view that it is unnecessary to find an alternative to sovereignty.
Common concern, and accordingly the needs of the international community,
are moulding sovereignty in order to respond to the challenges of
globalisation. The functional powers of the state confer custodianship on
states. This means that sovereignty embodies custodial elements. The state still
has the primary obligation to fulfil the ESCRs of its inhabitants and may guard
its citizens against the imperialist actions of other states. However, the
custodial element implies that the state acts as a custodian for the international
community in fulfilling the common concern. Furthermore, common concern
requires equitable burden-sharing in the common goal of the fulfilment of
ESCRs. 
My discussion vindicates sovereignty and affirms that sovereignty entails
rights and obligations for states. The impact of the current phase of
globalisation may result in a change in the rights and obligations of states,
which may in turn lead to a revision of sovereignty. Sovereignty may,
therefore, be adapted in accordance with the needs of the international
community. 
Thus, the common concern may provide a basis for the development of duties
to promote transnational ESCRs. The rights holders and duty bearers need to
be clarified as does the content of the rights and duties. Differential treatment
provisions in international environmental law may serve as examples of the
division of the responsibilities for the universal promotion of ESCRs among
states. Ultimately, my discussion indicates how it is possible to develop an
application of ESCRs that transcends borders in pursuit of global justice on the
basis of solidarity. It is only in this way that human rights will have a true
universal application, and will contribute to the affirmation of the next
progressive phase in the development of international law, in that ‘we have
outlived the phase in the development of international law when the law could
properly be envisaged as the rules governing the mutual relations of sovereign
States’ and if we are to ‘lay a firm foundation for future development’
international law must be ‘regarded as the common law of mankind in an early
phase of its development’.74
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